

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date

2 April 84

To: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. <i>IC Staff</i>		
2. <i>Information Handling Committee</i>		
3. <i>att:</i> [Redacted]		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See file
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

*attached FYI - Joland ?  
put the attached together to  
explain to [Redacted] our objective.  
We have also given [Redacted]  
a copy in connection with NSA  
plans to input DO product*

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
<i>C/PCSI</i> [Redacted]	Phone No.
5041-102	MM 41 (Rev. 7-76)

## M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Use of Initial Dissemination Criteria as a  
Means for Defining "Need to Know" in Retrospective  
Retrieval of DO Intelligence Information Reports

The following is presented to explain what we believe would be an acceptable method by which "need to know" access controls on retrospective retrieval of DO reports from the SAFE C & D data banks could be established. At the outset we wish to make clear that we are concerned with all classified DO product and not just ORCON controlled information. The initial statement of need filed by components within any agency with their central unit responsible for disseminating incoming message traffic must, it seems to us, be an effort to validate and define "need to know" for the concerned element. These definitions and parameters for limiting initial access to information can and must be applied to retrospective retrieval to maintain any semblance of "need to know" access control.

1. We believe that all customers receiving DO intelligence information reports base the initial dissemination of these reports to analysts in their various components on established "need to know" criteria. These criteria relate to specific and officially authorized functions essential to accomplish national security tasks. In order not to inundate analysts with irrelevant information, the initial dissemination must per force be limited to analysts whose official duties relate to the geographic and substantive nature of the reports.

2. These "need to know" criteria are normally expressed in statements of needs or profiles filed by the various components with the central dissemination facility in each receiving agency or department. Further, these profiles may be computerized so that by the use of a keyword dictionary, reports are then selected responsive to the needs of the various offices in each component.

3. The success of applying these initial "need to know" criteria to a retrospective retrieval system is dependent on the ability of each consumer to monitor these statements to ensure that they are valid and as complete as possible. There should also be a periodic revalidation procedure to provide currency to the statements filed in relation to the mission of the unit concerned.

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4. Such a procedure has been established within CIA by regulation. The purpose of this procedure is to more closely monitor strict adherence to the need to know principle in dissemination within CIA of foreign intelligence information reports. Dissemination requests sent to the responsible dissemination office in the Office of Communications must be approved by a senior staff officer in the Directorate of Operations prior to implementation. The procedure further provides that these requests will be reviewed on at least an annual basis by the originating component and revalidated by the same DO staff.

5. Attached is a sample of the computerized distribution envelope now appearing on a typical DO disseminated report which also includes ODPS-S to signify that the report and the distribution envelope is to be included in the DI/SAFE. The same distribution envelope could be used also for retrospective retrieval purposes.

6. We propose that the same profile for initial distribution be used to establish limits on retrospective retrieval search access to DO product contained in DI/SAFE (or DIA/SAFE). This is not, in our view, the optimum in need to know but it is one we think both the collector and consumer can live with without major sacrifice for either.

7. We recognize that there will be circumstances where analysts' responsibilities or interests will unexpectedly transcend the initial "need to know" distribution. For instance, an analyst with geographic responsibilities following nuclear proliferation in a given country or region finds it necessary to obtain a global view of nuclear proliferation. In such a case, there will most likely be an office or offices with functional responsibility that received all the reports produced on that topic world-wide, e.g., in CIA it would be NED/OSWR. Thus the geographic analyst would go to the office with broader responsibilities and make his needs known before all pertinent information from the system could be retrieved. This would be a method of validating the new "need to know" and also providing a means for rapid access to required information. Clearly there are a number of variations possible for this type validation but the important element in every case is to build a system which eliminates the possibility of single analyst unilateral access to the entire data bank.

8. In sum, if DI/SAFE, or for that matter any computerized data base, could limit the retrospective retrieval to the initial dissemination profile this would be a critical initial step in

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satisfying DO's concerns regarding the retention of the "need to know" in any computerized data base that incorporates its product.

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